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For several decades equity-based compensation has been used as a tool to align the inc;:entives of 
company executives and employees with those' of the company shareholders. For instance globally, 
during the 1990's, there was an explosion in the issuance of employee stock options. This served 
several purposes, namely - to motivate managers, in the pursuit to increase company value and 
achieve long-term goals~ as a retention tool ~talented staff and also asa way for cash strapped 
young companies to reward employees without the need to divert cash from operating activities. 
The global financial crisis, accompani8d by a ~ultitude of very costly high profile bailouts, has led to 
significant shareholder and tax payer dissatisfaction, and has succeeded to highlight the Inherent ' 
deficiencies of traditional share-based incentive schemes such as stock options. Increased scrutiny 
and calls for better corporate governance, together with evolving accounting and tax treatment, have 
ultimately led to a shift ,in share-based incentive sChemes practices. Globally, several 'important 
developments have emerged. For instance, there has been a marked move away from simple stock 
option-type schemes towards less dllutive Share Appreciation Rights and also full quantum share 
schemes. In addition, performance conditions (relative as well as absolute) have become increasingly 
prevalent in terms of grant vesting (PWe, 2011). 
The objective of this study is to examine the Current long-term share-based incentive schemes used 
by JSE listed companies based on data from 50 large and mid cap companies. 'It aims to identify 
, trends in terms of prevalent scheme types, average scheme siZe relative to issued share capital, ' 
settlement methods, valuation models used, construction of model inputs and the use -of performance 
conditions. Thesf)trends are framed in the context of South African tax leg!Slation and IFRS2 
accounting standards. The analysis indicates that in recent years South African listed companies 
have followed the global approach towards share-based incentIVes, namely: 
• Share Appreciation Rights are being used more frequently 
• Full quantum schemes are ,also becoming more popular 
• There is increased use of performance conditions embedded in grants 
• Companies are moving away from the ·one siz~ fits all· approach and are starting to use 
combinations of schemes to simultaneously address issues such as staff retention, preventing 
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Chapter 1 - IntrOd.uctlon 
1~ 1Gei1eral Background 
Share incentive schemes and specifically stock options have been one of the mostpopLilar forms of 
pay for more than two decades. While initially scheme penetration did . not go .past the top 
m8t18gement of companies, with time stock options became more and more recognis8d as a 
mechanism to provide employees with equity-based compensation. Conceptuany options issuance 
intends to ad.dress several purposes: 
" 
.' to solve the inherent agency problem between company shareholders and mangers and align 
their long-term incentives ' 
• in the pursuit.of shareholder value creation, as a motlvatlon.tool for managers/employees by 
creating a direct link between their remuneration and the company share price 
• together with time-based vesting conditions, it serves as a retentloa tool for employees, 
enhancing commitmentand reducing staff turnover 
• to avoid diverting cash from operatklg activities and viable projects 
. There was an explosion of stock option issuance by companies globally during the 1990's. This was 
not coincidental. The decade Was characterised by 8c0n0mic growth, low volatility and a powerful bull 
market. At the same time the high-tech boom translated. into frequent initial public offerings. followed 
by rapid share price appreciation, generally inflated company valuations and a resulting quest by 
start-up companies to attract talented managers in the preserlG,8 of little or no cash flows. According 
. , 
to research done by Narayanan and Seyhun (2005),.In 1992 in the US there were 940 option grants 
by 126 firms with a total of 17.3mHlion shares granted. 1999 saw the peak of option issuance in the 
US with 72,617 grants by 4,595 companies with a total of 2.94 billion shares granted. Furthermore, in 
1980 the average stock option grant represented less than 20% of direct executive pay in the US. In 
I 
contrast, by 1998"the chief executive offICerS (CEO's) of the largest US companies received annual 
~tock option awards larger than their salaries and bonuses combined (Hall, 1998). 
, 
There is, however,' another more subtle but very important reason for the proliferation of employee . 
stock options during the 1990's';" more relaxed accou'ntlng standards. Unt" the advent of the revised, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (SFAS 123R) in the US and the International 
Financial Reporting Standard 2 (IFRS2) globally in 2005, employee stock options granted at or out of 
the money did not have to be recognised as an· expense by companies. Given this disclosure-only 
based approach, they were simply included ·as a footnote in the financials. Since they had no impact 
on the company financial statements, options issued to employees did not put a drag on earnings. In 
short, options were seen (incorrectly) by company boards and managers as almost "free to grant" and 




















theoptionsandtheirdilutive-effecttQthecomp8ny(Je~ats/., 2004)~PemapsOneofthe more 
- - -
- strikingeXampiesot this_ practice came .from Apple Computers Inc. In 2000 the company stated Steve 
. Jobs' -salary as being .$1.At the same time he received share options worth $400 million. This 
amount was not charged to the income statement, consistent with prevaiUngaecounting standafds 
(Botosan at a/., 2001). 
The tum of the century_-led to- a number of signifJCantdevelopments. The' spectacular failures of 
companies like Enron and WorId.com,widespread revelations offail~corpOrategovernance 
_ systems, corporate miSdeeds, manipulated financial reporting, _ fraud' and bankruptcy occurred 
simultat190Usly with the blJrstofthe high-tech bubble and the loss of trillions of dollarS of equity value. 
This firmly pUt the spotlight on executive remuneration_practices and for the first time the effICaCY of 
share-baSed remuneration was questioned in the context of agency problems _and excessive risk 
taking 'by managers. In addition" it motivated regulations such as the Sarbanes-OxleY (SOX) A~ and 
the revision and harmonisation of global accounting standards (Jensen .t a/~. 2004). In terms of 
- - -
IFRS2andSFAS 123R, share-based incentive schemes were properly accounted for and expensed 
over the veSting periOd in company financial statements from 2005 onwards. 
- -~ 
Another signifICant accounting scandal related to stock options cam,eta light in 2005. Studies showed , 
-that a number of option grants in the US had been timed retroactively byback-dating the strike price, 
thus artificially inflating the option pay-off and, in the process,rQbbing company shareholders of value 
1 
(Lie, 2005). It was found that this practice had been taking place for an extended period of time and 
the discovery attracted substantial attention from both the media and regulatorS. Similar studies 
followed iti other markets, including South Africa where some back-datingOf grants has also 
potentially taken place (Holman at a/., 2010). The SOX Act in the US and IFRS2 internationally have 
effectively largely put a stop to this practice by requiring greater disclosure and _ specifically' by 
ensuring that companies are forced to reveal the strike price of each grant almost immediately after 
the grant date. 
In 2007 the roaring bull market started to falter, the Sub-Prime crisis began unfolding, ultimately 
- leading ta a global- financial crisis. A string of high-profile- and extremely COStly company ball-outs 
ensued in both the US and Europe. This succeeded to further highlight the inherent deficiencies of 
- traditional share-based Incentive schemes, originally aimed _ at aligning shareholder and managerial 
incentives, preventing excessive risk taking and fostering a longer-term more strategic behaviour by 
manaQers. The resulting increased scrutiny and calls. for better corpoi'ate governance, together with 
evolving accounting and tax treatment, have -ultimately led to a shift in share-based incentive 
schemes practices (PWC, 2011). 











GlobaUy; several important developments have emerged over the past five OI'Soye8rS. For instance 
overall issu~ ofstockoptk)ns hasdectined and the a~ size ofsha~ incentive 
· schemes relative to issued share capital hSsSlsO· deCIined.Thei-e has also . been a marked move 
away frQrTl simple stock optiorl.~schemestOwa.-dslessdilUtive$hareAppreciatiOn Rights and also 
full·9uantum shaie.Schemes.Mother im~ntdevelQPmentate performance.condltionswhich·~ave 
become IncreasinQIy,prevalEtntin terms of grant vesting .. ·Sharehofders •. regulatorsandother 
stakeholders have successfullY.PUShedcompaniEtS to proVide' greaterarT10lJnts performance-b8sed 
· equttyaUhe expenSe of tim~veStinQ (PWC. 2011)' Such pertormance conditions ~nbe either 
"', ". '.' ",' . . . 
absolute (e:g. based On intemal targets such asreb:tm on equity -ROE orretumon Invested capital-
· ROIC) or r8tative (4it;g.b8sedoil shareholder retum agafnstapeergtoup()f companies or anindustiy 
. . . . '.. . . . 
benchmark). Often combinations ofa~ute and rel8tivepenormanceCOndbs are present in the 
I .... . 
. .. 
sameschemetoen~ bolflth.eattainmgoflntemaltargets as ,Yi8flasto ensure strong relative 
performance by thecqmpany and avOid simply rewarding maNtgers for luck. furthermOre. companies 
are forced to proVide significanUymore disclosureaboutsh8re-basedincentives. in their finanCial 
statements. are deeidedlymore cognisant of issues such, as dilution and tax optimisation and are 
prepared to look more Caretully at the design of ~ncentiveschemes{PWC. 2011). 
1.2 Termaand Abbreviations Used 
The following terms are ~ interchangeably In. the text: 
·EXercise price· and·Strike price" 
· • Firm· and ·Company" 
·Option expiry date· and ·Option maturity date· 
·Share· and ·Stock· and "Equity" 
·Share options· and ·Stockoptions" and ·Equity options· 
The following abbreviation~· are used in the text: 
APB Accounting Principles Board 
ATM At-The-Money 
BS Black-5choles (or Black-scholes-Merton) 
BEE Black Economic Empowerment 
CEO Chief executive Officer 
CGT CaPital Gains. Tax 
COE Cost Of Equity 
eRR Cox-Ross-Rubinstein 










































Eamings Per Share 
EmployeeShareiStock OptiOn 
. Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Hult-:-White 
lntemational Accounting Standards 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
In-The-Money 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE Limited) 
Low Exercise Price·Option 
Long-term Incentive Plan 
,~ 
MonteCarto 
Net Income After Cost of capital 
Over The Counter 
Out-The-Money 
Return On Capital Employed 
.Return On Capital 
Return On Invested Capital 
Republic of South Africa 
Share Appreciation Right 
South. African Revenue Serv~e 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
Sarbanes:.oxtey Act 
Share Right 
Total Shareholder Return 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Volume Weighted Average Price 













. • roexamine the, valuatjc)n modelscpmm.onlyused for valui"g s~b8sed incentiVes in lhe 
context of some of tl:lemorespecificfeatures ofsuctlincentives 
., To examine the accounting and tax tr'eatmentofsha~sed.incentivesglobaflyandin South 
Africa· 
• To examine the current long.,term share-based incentive schemes used by JSE listed 
companies 
.J 
• To gain an understanding. of: 
o prevalent scheme typeS 
o average scheme size relative to issued share capital 
o settlement methods used -e.g. cash vs. stock 
o method for setting the strike price on schemes with stock options 
<;> valuation models used 
o methods for constructing model·inputs such as volatility and interest rates 
o the types of performance conditions used 
• As a reasonability check, to attempt· to re-perform the valuation of a random option-based 
grant and determine: 
o the integrity of the inputs used by the resPective company 
o . the validity and accuracy of the ~luation models used 
1.4 Methodology 
This study is based on a detailed analysis of the latest annual financi~t statements of 50 JSE listed 
companies (see Appendix A for list of .companies)~ The companies ~hosen are the 40 constituents of 
the FrSElJSE TOP40lndex (Bloomberg code: TOP40<lndex» as of the 30th of Noverrtber 20111. To 
get a better urlderstanding of schemes used by smaller. companies and avoid complete large cap 
, . . ~"/ 
dominance in the chosen sample, another 10' companies were selected with. market capitalisation 
slightly below. that of the TOP4OIndex constituents. The 50 companies. chosen for the study have a' 
combined market cap which comprises 76% of the market cap of the FTSElJSE AlI·,Share Index 
(Bloomberg code: JALSH <Index». In this context, it was feltthat they COristituiea suffICiently strong 
representative sample to facilitate. understanding of.the share-based incentive practices prevalent 
, 
among JSE listed companies. 
1 With respect to Investec and Mondi, only the Inward listed entitieS were inciuded. 










A review of literature teiatedto Share-bas8d incentive schemes, their, rnstqry, evolution, general 
mechanics~aCCOUntingancj~'treatmentw8saISO perfor'n1ed. 1l1isUteraturereview fOrms part of 
, ,severa1chaptets, namelyChapt8rs 2. 3, 4 and 5; 
1.5As8umptionsandUmltations 
, " 
The study does not distinguish between share-based ,incentive schemes for company executive 
directOrS' and other. senior managers amt emP.l~s. Although the schemes offered 'to· executive ' 
directors are manifestly more visible in the company financial statements,given the prevailing 
mandatory disclosure ~Ies, ,the basic terms and mechanics of the schemes and the tax and 
accounting implications are the same for aU company. em ployees. What usuallytenClsto vary between 
executive, directors and' other senior managers and· employees is the Rand value· as a 'proportion of 
total remuneration package. 
Recen~ developments incorporate, governance have led companies to examine more closely how 
, , 
remuneration.serves to ,align employee 'incentives with ,those, of shareholders. 'As such, companies 
are moving away from the -one size fits' all- and are designilig,companywide remuneration 
frameworks with different, terms, tenors and generally increasing complexity. In this context, often 
some overlap exists between what' is usuaUy' referred, to as ,short term variable pay and long-term 
share-based incentives. NormallY,short term variable pay consists of an annual performance based 
cash bonus with some choice' to convert this bonus, into shares, which may have vesting conditions. 
Given the broad and varied nature of remuneration schemes as a whole, this study focusespureiy on 
the long-term share-based schemes used by companies. 
The study does' not incorporate share based Incentive schemes related to Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). BEE and specifically black company ~ershlp is a distinctly South African 
development which has led 'to formidable,tax and fmancial engineering over the past decade. In the 
context of the varied and complex nature of BEE focused equity ownership' schemes, theSe were 
purposefully excluded from the study, 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
\ 
This chapter provides a general background with a brief history of share-based incentive schemes, 
J 











• Chapter; 2 ~APrimerOnOptiOrisThecxyand Employee Stock Option (ESO) Valuation 
This chapter explains the basic concepts related to options .anc) their v8tuation~lt also Provides an 
, outfineof ~issU~8tJJ1'OUI1ding employee stock oPtion valuation. ' . .' , 
ChaQter3-TypesofShare-basedlncentive Schemes 
,'ThischaptQr provides an overview of the wOrkings of, ,commonly used lon~tenn share-based 
inCEtntive sChemes. 
Chapter 4 .. Accounting Treatment of Share-Based'incentives 
This c~pter looks at the accounting treatment of share-pa$ed incentive schemes in SOUth ; Africain 
the' context ofIFRS2. 
Ch@pter; 5 - Tax Treatment of Share-Based Incentives 
This chapter looks at the. tax treatment of share-based incentive schemes in South Africa in the 
context of theamendn,entsto Section 8 of the Tax Act NaSa of 1962. ' 
Chapter 6 - ResultS and Findings 
The results of the study &represented in this chapter. 
Conclusjon 












-~ .. ' 
, . C~_pter 2-APrimerOilOPtIonsTheC)f)f-i1d Etflployee StOck Option (ESO).VaIUdOn 
. 2.1GenenlI~Theory 
AdtHivatlve'isa $8CUrity which deriVEtS its valuefrom,thevalueof anoth8raSset.{cahedthe under1ying 
. . . .. '. . . . ..... - , 
, asset).OPti~togetherwithotherderivatJvecontractS .h8vebeeOusedin~rri~fOrcenturies. In 
fact theeartiest optiontradefec9r~ed~nW8$temliterature was a beton' a Mureolive eropby Thales 
of Miletus.retounted 'by Ari$totIein hisPoI1tics. Thal~ did riot trade·aCtuat OliVes. but'instead chose , 
. . ".",. ," .•.. .' ... ". . " .. ".. ..J." .. ", .... ", .. - . 
to buy the equivalent of a call OPtion on oIivepressesfOr~ldellVery(Taleb.1996);'" ' 
Options area form of a non~inearderivativein the sense that they confer a rightand not an obligation 
on' the' holder Of the option. 'A call option gives the holder therightbutnottheobligati~to pUrchaSe 
. '. .' . . . . 
theunderlyfng 8S$etat a pre-agreed priceonOr~apre..eectctate inthEt:future; COnversely. a 
put option gives" the holder ttMt. rightbulnof JheobligStloltto sell the under1ying asselat a pre-agreed 
prtCeon or beforeaprtHgreeddateinthe futUre (Hull.2005}.Th8pr"greedpriceisca'ledthe 
strikeOrexe~i.priCe;thefuture.date is c&IIEKfthe,expiry date and thetimeuntJI,theexpirydateis 
called the option term. An American option can bEt, exercisecfanytime before expiry. while a European 
.' . . . , 
option can only be exerciSed on the expiry date. 86rmlJdan options are options which can be 
exercised only onp...specified days or durihgpre.specified periods prior to expiry. The value of the 
. '. . . '-
option is the option premium, an amount the buyer pays tothesetler (Hull, 2005). Options with a 
'strike price equal to the price of the undertying asset at Inception of the trade are said to be struck at-
tfle-money. Options wHh a strikepric8 above the price rJf thEt undetlying asset (for calls). or below the 
price of the underlying asset (for puts). are Said to be.truck out-the-tn0fJ6y. options with a strike price 
below the price of the u~ertying asset (fOr Calls)~OrabOve the price oftheunde11ylngasset (for puts) 
are said to be struck in-the-money(HUII. 2005). 
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.' . . ". . . ::" ' 
In>thisslmpte~inple.the buyer of the option wllfPaY a premium ofZAR 10 to acquire the optiOn 
fr'omtheseller;ln a y8aJ'stime, on the expiry date, two~ible scenariosean takeptace dependiOg 
on the pfevamngABC share price: '. 
Scenario 1(e~g.ABCshare price = ZARgo) 
". '. , 
'1n thisinstahCethe ABC share price is be10w the option strike' price.the.option will expire out-the- . 







Asa result, the option holder wHr haveloslthe'premium only. 
Seenari02 (e.g. ABC share price = ZAR 140) 
In this instance the ABC share price Is above the option strike price. The: wtion wRI expire in-the-
money (ITM) and the h.9lderwlUexerciseit. The hoIderwln~yoneABSshare from the option seller 
for ZAR 100 (th8option. slnke prieerand will then. sell It immediately on the open market forZAR140, 
in the processmakin9ZAR40; Alternatively, in Instano.s.where tile option iseash-settled. the option 
~Ier will simply pay ZAR 40 to the holder. The profit and loss. (P&L) will be as follows: 






As ean be. seen from the aboVe example,Options have a convex pay-off to the extent that they 
effectively work in one direction. The ~tionbuyer1S su~jeCt to a limited loss (the premium) and 
potentially unlimited upside,whiletheseller is sub~t to the opposite ":'nmited gain (the premium) and 
potentially unlimited 100s. As such options have a distinct gearing etfect.Forexample, In the second 
scenario above,' th(:)hoIder enjoyed a 300% retum on' their capitat AI'lother important fact to note. is 
that.. unlike linear pay-off derivatives such as forwards and futures, . the convexity of options' pay-off 
means that they atwayS have an upfrontvalue. 
Options have been traded on different markets ·for centuries. However, until the advent of. the . " .'. . . 
eponymous Black-Scholes .. Met1Ot'\equation (Black at a/., 1973), options pricing was mostly done 
. . 
using tricks and heuristically derived methodologies. A1thoughthe~ula itself was not necessarily 
. . 
unique and earlier versions did exist, theBlack-8choles-Merton (commonly referred to as Black-
Scholes) Srgument presented an e1egantneo-classicalfinance solution and, as such. paved the way 
for a more forrrialand widely accepted way to valueop~s(Taleb, .2008). Since then a number of 










technlquesh$Ve ernerged(e.g.Binomialtrees arid Montecarlof most of which at least to some 
extentutilisethebasicBJack-&:hoIes arguments. 
The value of a call optIOn stems fronlthe ability comerrecfontheholder to buy the underlying assefat 
a discountto the prevailing price, as illustrated by the above example (scenario 2). Therefore,the 
. - . . . . . - . 
value of a call at any point In time can be decomPosed into the immediate discount It offers (the 
difference between the prevailing ,spot price an~ thestrike);~lIed intrinsic value, and the ,probability 
,that the call may go evendeeperlTM and offer an even bigger discount pr;or:to expiry, called time 
value. Correspondingly, a call option may be OTM prior to expiry and still have some time value due 
to some probability that it may go back to being .ITMbeforeit expires. Needless to say,on the day of 
expiry. options have no time value. The same conc::eptsareappUcabieto a put option. In this context, 
the value of options On equities is subject tosaveral importantinputs. namely- the expected share 
price volatility over the optionterm, the interest rate applicable for that maturity and the dividet;d yklld 
the share will pay over the option term (l;Iull,,2005}~ASsuch, the value of call oplionsissensitive to 
changes in these inputs as well as changes In the share price. TheSe sensitivities are referred to as 
. . . 





sensitivity to changes in the underlying share price 
sensitivity to changes· in expected share . price volatility 
As mentioned already, employee stock options have been widely used as part of compensation 
packages for a number of years. ESO's are 'effectively calroptions on the shares of' the respective 
company which issues them . to the employee. They give' the right to the employee to purchase. the 
company sharesJor the strike price on or before a particular date in the future. There are, however, 
some key differences between ESC's and standard calls traded on exchanges and in the over the 
counter (OTC) market, namely:' 
• ESO's have significantly longer termscomparedtooorm81 exchange and OTC traded calls. 
This term can be anything up to tenyears (BuloW at aI., 2005). 
• ESO's effectively display both BermudanandAmericarl option features. They do not vest 
automatically to the employee on the date theY are granted. Given that they often serve as an 
employee retention tool, normally they have avesting date at a point several years after grant 
date (e.g. 3 Years after grant date) and can only be exercised after that date. After vesting, 
they cart then be ,exercised any time before expiry (West, 2005). Vesting often.takes place 
gradually over. time- e.g. 113 of the options grant vests in year 3, another 1/3 in year 4 and 











empfoyee leaves the firm priortott.e vesting date, the options (or particular unvested 
tranches) .are forfeited. 
• Unlike· standard exchange and . OTCtraded caUs, ESO's are' not transferable- i.e. the 
employee pan not sell the options they have received as part of their remuneration atany 
. point, eVeniftheoptiof'l, have vestecLOhcetheoptions have~ested, they have to be 
exercised prior to expiring. NeedleSs to say, the employee win only exercISe-options which are 
ITM.This is important; because itmeansthatthe employee can only ever ~ive,the Intrinsic 
value of the option by exercising It and never the tim~value it may have prior to expiry. 
• There is also a more subtle but important difference. In most circumstances it is never optimal 
to exercise an. option prior to expiry. It ma'kesmore ~se to sell it, given ItS tirrie value. In the 
caseofESO's, however, the non-tranSferability feature means that •. to generate cash 
. . .'
proceeds or 19 diversify their portfolios, employees tend to exercise their options often Well . ... . . . '., . 
before the options reach expiry (Hull,. atal., 2002). 
• Another tess obvioUs difference is the fact that employee attrition and the share. price of the 
company are inversely correlated. A companY With adeclinlng share price is more likely to lay· 
off employees and, conversely,emplo~ with valuableunvested options (e.~. options .which 
are deePITM) are less likely to leave the company voluntarily (Bulow at aI., 2005): . 
From what has been said so far it is clearly evident that ESO's always have a value on the date they 
are granted by the company to the employee. yet ironicaJlyuntil IFRS2 and SFAS123Rwere 
implemented in 2005, it was not mandatory for companies to expense ESO's in their financial 
statements. The accounting treatment of ESO'sisdlscussed in more detan In Chapter 4, however it is 
important to mention that the methodology for expensing share-based incentives as prescribed by the 
accounting standards Is closely linked to the abnlty to establish a fair value'for suchincentlYes. As a 
result, the valuation of share-based incentives and specifically eso's, given their unique features, has . "", 
been subject to a lot of de~. 
The first thing which tends to ~e problems when it comes to fair-valuing ESO's is their extended 
term. Normally, in the presence of a Uquld market for short dated shareoptlonsitisvery easy to Imply 
• " • -..>' 
the ·jnplJts used by the market to arrive at a fair v;:alue for an option with a particular. strike and expiry. 
For example, backing outthe expected (implied) volatility from short dated exchange·traded·options is 
exceedingly simple inmostgtobalmarkets. However. :optlons With a term of 5 or more yearsatmost 
never trade (with the exception of convertible debt securities which have embedded equity options) 
which makes constructing an important input such as Implied share price volatility with . a good degree 
of accuracy almost impossible. As a result, companies tend to<resortto a shortcut and use the 
historical volatility of their share price instead. TechnicaUythis itS incorrect, but In the absence of a 
robust m~odto arrive atan implledV()1atHityfora specificoptionterm,itoften maybe the only way 
(Oldfield, 2008). A somewhat slm ilar problem exists in terrTlsof the dividend yield the share Is likely to 











pay during the option.tenn •. 1t is .lmpo$Sibie·for any company, . regardless of size. ·~.accuratelypredict 
macro ancl micro economicf8ct()tSfor the next >1 Oyearsanc:t thef:efoieC()fl1mltto, a specific dividend 
pay~tratlo based .. ortfutureeamlngs. Again. in thisinsta~ companies tend to loOk . af historical 
pay-out ratiOs and use those as guidelines to arriveata djvidend yield. Interest rates. as an input into 
option valuation models. tend topQse fewerprobiems. s.1nce liqu!dinterest rate curves exist wen past 
. , ..' . .' . 
the expiry of most ESO's. 
The non-transferability of ESQ's in the hands oftheempioyee' presents anoth8rproblem. From 
.' ~ . 
theoretical standpoint; this feature lowers the value of the option compared to that ofa nonnal caD 
option. However, it is important to note thatthlsvalue differs depending on whether one l()Oks at it 
from the point of view of the employee or that of the Issuing company. Admittedly the option may have 
a reduced value to the employee. At the same time, however, it still represents a1iabllity to the 
company and it should be represented in the companyfinancialsbased. on its cost· to the company 
and not its value to the. employee .. Oldfield (2008) iUustratesthis With a simple example where a 
company gives a Christmas turkey to an employee as pclrtof remuneration. For the employee who 
does not eat turkey and cannot re-sefl the bird, the gift has no value. Despite this compensation 
failure, the comPany bought the turkey anfJ incurred the expense. The 'gift is not an. efficient 
compensation device for the particular employee, but the expense is recorded althe turkey's 
purchase price, not the employee's personal valuation of the turkey (Oldfield, 2008). 
Choosing the correct valuation model to value even simple ESO's has also been subject to significant 
amount of debate given the . new mandatory expensing rules for share-based payments. The 
accounting standards do not spec~ the use of a certain model, only requiring the model to be 
suitable for the scheme in question, given its parameters. There are three someWhat obvious choices, 
namely: 8Iack-Scholes, Cox~Ross-Rubfnstein binomial trees and Monte Carlo numerical valuation. 
The Black-Scholes model is decidedly the most rigid model In terms' of the assumptions it 
Incorporates. Yet it is perhaps the simplest and, given this simplicity, the most widely accepted, ESO's 
almostaJways have vesting conditions attached and as such differ from normal exchange andOTC 
tradedcaHs -i.e. initially they have a Bermudan feature and then they effectively t)ecome Americ8n 
options' after they vest. The· BS model was speciflcallydev.elopedto· value European . options which 
cannot be exerciSed prior to'expiry (Finch. at a/ .• 2007). In addition, as mentlonedabove,the non-
transferability feature of ESO's tends to encourage counterintuitive early exercise of options by 
employees. This aspect of an ESOeffectively serves to shorten its Ufe.ln order to useithe BSmodet 
an f'xp8ctf'd /iffI, Which falls at some point between vesting and expiry, n_s to be calculated by the 
company, based on . estimates of employee exercise behavioUr. This in itself creates inaccuracy, 
because the estimates _e generally>subjective. Also, the expected life of the optIOn, being nothing 
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more than aflartifiCialconstrucUo tacilj~tetheuseofa modelnotortQinaUymeant to~ used for this 
pur))OSe,~alSouniformIY shc>rter thanthecontractuaLlife.Thi~meansthat an option which is OTM 
andcl~to reaching itS expected· expiry, WilihavelitUevafueeVen though in reality thecontractuai 
expiryissometkneawayand the option could stili end up being fTM (West, 2005). 
The eRR binomial tree {orlattice)'mQdel offers a more robUst and flexible way to valueE~O's .. It was 
. . 
originally developedasasimpllfKKl extension of the BS inodel and was aimed at extending itS" 
usefulness beyorld some of its rjgid confines. 1118 CRFflattice modS divides the time to option expiry 
into smaller increments and discrete future share price paths. At any time poJntthe sharepncecan 
. . 
diverge I" one of two possible paths (Hull. 2005). The discretiSation of the option term and the share 
. "" " 
price path is preciSely what makes the CRR lattice mcldel more flexible. This effectively enables the 
incorpor8tionofdifferento6r1ditions and inputs at each discrete interval .. For instance, the model can 
handle b8tter. early exer:cise' conditiorl$. without the need to artificially' adjust ·the . contractual expiry 
date. Also" employee attrition rates can potentially bein~ted iotothe valuatioribysetting some 
predetermined conditions at each discrete Interval (Oldfietd,2008).lntact, as will become evident in 
Chapter 4, em~oyee attrition rateS {i.e. the fact that someernployees leave the company prior to 
vesting and, as a result, forfeit. their options), being a non-markfJt related factor, are dealt with in a 
specific way by WRS2- they are actually not incorporated into the fair value of the options on grant 
date. However, the CRRlattice model offers enough flexibilitYfor~ to be done inside the modeL It 
is also more robust in terms of handling market related performancecond,itions which, as wilJ become 
, ' "" ~ " " -
evident, are becoming more and more prevalent in share-based incentive schemes. Another 
advantage is. the ability to use varying inputs at each discrete interval. For Instance, one of the main 
constraints ofthe BS model is that it assumes constant volatility for the term of the option. In reality 
this is never the case. 'Volatility itSelf is voI~tile and changes through time. Option markets are well 
aware of thJs phenomenon and adjust for it by using volatility skew in the 'case of equities - i.e. OTM 
puts have higher implied volatility compared to OTM call, or put simply options with lower strikes 
exhibit higher implied volatilitY than those with higher strikes {Hull. 2005). A lattice model enables, the 
use of local volatility, i.e. different volatilitY for each discrete' time Interval, which Is more techniCally 
correct. More. granular and accurate versions of the lattice model also exist where the lattice is 
trinomial -at each discrete interval the share price path can diverge into three possible paths rather 
than just two (Hull, 2005). 
Hull and White '(2003) have proposed a valuation model for standard ESC's which is well suited to 
accommodate the . early exercise behaviour displayed by employees. It· is based on the more flexible 
trinomial lattice verSion and effectively treats andESO as a combination of two exotic options - a gap 
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, • optkm2and~nU~ ,~calP. 'c#ion,wjtharflt>ale. To inc0rp0r8tethepOOmtialforearty> 
exercise; HullandWhiteassurriethattheemptoYee'Will'e~theoptlOO,witha strikeKa&socin .. ' 
, ,tI1eshare priCe,(S) reaches, ~'level(call.t M), 'ahdthe ~tion beCon18sd8epITM" Whichleveldftn' 
" sUffident incentive ftx the employee to cash 'ouf bY$(eroising. Thevafue M, wiffbedifferentfor 
differ;,.,t- employees"butcanbebasecton.hjstoricalestinla~ (Hull at a/.,~3).Thegapormoll ' 
• com$St~Jif8 on grant date and expireS mfthe vesting.date.'()nthevestin~date,the' 98P6ptioh Will' ' 
pay the; difference betweenS andK, COndltlooaJon S being abOve M. itS IsbelpWM.the gap option' 
wiH expire worthless. At this point ,the barrier optionWillcOmetolife.wOditionafonSbeinQbelOWM 
(altematively, if Sis above M, t~.gap optionwilf haVe paid outandthebarrieroptionsimPtywillnOt' 
eometoUfe). Between the vesting date and the contractu$lexplry date ofthe'ESOif S everUad$S at 
or abov~M.thebarrieroption will knock-out(cease to exist) and will simultaneol.Jsly pay a r8bate 
.' '. " . . '.' .. '. . 
equal to the 'difference between M and K. itS never touches Mbefore the option expIres,onthe 
expiry ~te the option will simply P$YMAX(S - K,Ol- i.e.thepay-offofa standardcaUoption (van Zyf 
'. •..  '. I 
at a/;,2007).The elegance of th6 HW model for valuing ESO's comes from 'the fact that it provides . ". . . .. . . ~ 
" the ability to incorporate .severaiconditionS at the same time - early exercise (via the M faCtor), ' 
employee attrition rates at each dtscreteintervaJ onthetril19fT1iai lattice, as well as potentially othef 
varying inputs; 
The MonteCario technique is decidedly the mosfflexiblemodel. ltis a numerical technique for 
valuing options via the USe of simulations, Inconb"astto analytical fcirmula-based ones 'such as SS. 
An almost infinite amount of optionpay-Off profiles can be created over single as well as multiple 
. . . . ~ . 
underlying assets~As such, the MC method is perfectly SUited for the valuation of more complex 
share-based schemes with intricate performance conditions. An 'example of such an'instrum,nt'is the 
indexed ESO. This option is ~ised on the concept of relative company p8rtormance.ltis built as a 
way to avoidsirtlply rewarding managers for luck. Unlike the strike price of a standard ESO which is 
fixed on grant date, the, strike of the, indexed option is referenced off an index of 'comparable 
companies and can reset upwards during the option term ae that index performs well. In doing so it 
ensures that ,at expiry 'the option will only be ITM, and deliver a payment If the company has 
outperformed the, respective index of comparable companies (Meulbroek, 2001). The MC valuation 
method is perfectly suited for such a complex multi-assetpay-off profile. Interestingly, suchan option 
introduces another dimension to the varuation inputs -the correlation between the share 'price Of'the 
company andthat.of the basket/lndex of comparable companieS~ 
2 A gap option.has two strikes - one which determines the Pily-off and another one which determines whether 
the option can be exercised. It is effectively a form of aknock4n bartieroptlon. 
3 Anup...and.-outca" Is a ca"oPtlOn which exists only as Jong as the, up"'and-out barrier has not been breached. 
If the barrier is breached, the option knocks out and ceases to exist. A rebate is sometfmesoffered to the 
buyer as compensation. 










. ······.·.Fto.nWhatrnisbeen di~cus$edsofar, iHseYidenfthat~suchasthet~terms of ESO's, the 
. ' ...... e8t1;eXerclS~~viourOfemployeEJS~fldaISoth6SmpjoyfJeattriti()nrates. make.valUirig ESO's 
.. . . chai1enging~[)Uringthe initial proposals forr~ing.the8ccOOntingstandard, to make eXP8tlSlngof 
,shar8-based,paynlents mandatory, it was'th~fact()fSWhlchci-eateda subsumtlal debate.' 
..•.. ()PPonents of &xPensingfelt thaUheQUjefelines Prop()Se(f:to'deal \¥ithsuch~plexitl.(discussed In 
. . mOl'e·detail In Chapter 4) werearl?itrary andwouidleacltolnaccuraterepresetitatiQnofshare-based 
"Paym~ritsil'lthefinaooial statet;rtents of~pa"ies(Sacho.ata/.,2004). InthiSconteld,severat 
.. ' acaciemicshayeproposedasubStatitiaUydjfferentapproach to loOking at valuingandexper\sing . 
. ..' ESO's.. Bulow and ShOvep (2005) h~veproposedtt1atesO's shouklbetreated arid expensed 
. . .... '. " 
similarly to the single largest component of compensation-the salary. Salarjes are simply expensed 
in thelncome statement as they are paid in each accounting period. Thecompaoy' doesl1ot calculate . . . . . . .' '. . 
. ~theexpected presentvalue of its future labour costs and then'~mortl~ that value over the employees 
projected futureye8rsof service. Instead it simply expenses what it pays the employee at the end of 
each accounting periocl(Bulowata/.,2005). Following fromthls, BulowandShoven(2005) propose 
.' tha(companiesshould expense the.value of ESO'swhoseterm Is only equaltoth8nexlaccounting 
. perioc:J(e;g. quarterJyor semi..anoually). At the end of each accOunting periodthecompanywiU re-
\ .' . 
value the ESO'sby extending the term tathe eOd of the succeeding accouming Period and using the 
- , . . 
prevailfng share price. This simpler approach-effectively means that the term ofthe:eSOis shortened' 
dramaticaHy. Itachieves the following: 
'" 
• It obviates the need to calculate long-term inputs such as implied volatifityand dividend yield. 
These can be calculated much moreaccurat8Jy in the short-term: 
• It is also no longer necessary to calculate long-term emploYee attrition rates. T~ quantity of 
'the ESO's can simply be adjusted as When employees leave the finn and forfeit their options; 
• . In addition, the possibility early exercise does not have to be factored in any loi'lger. 
• Lastly; theESO will effectively be marked to market based on the prevaHi"g sharepr;ce$lt the 
eod of each accounting period. therefore eliminating the bias towards a grant date valuation 
as ~bed by the current accoontlng$tandards (Bulow at aI., 2005). 
As wiH become evident from Chapter 4, the accoontlngstandards ultimately put in place work 
substantially differently from the exceedingly simple approach proposed by Bulow and Shoven. (2005). 
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c·Chapter3-Typ8s .ofShare..iMlatct·tncentiveSchem ••. 
. - -'" . .'. . . ..... - '. . 
Thelon9::termshate-basedincelltiveschernesWhich,~~n used andaretQ,alar~extentstill 
. being used in SouthAfricacanb8~Plinritodiffererd categories baSed on two keYfeaturM: 
1. The form of equttyparticipation: 
- '. ".' '" 
. 2. . The methodofsettiement: 
,appreciatiOnvs. fiJHparticipatiOn (orfuUquantum) 
. sha~ vs. cash 
",.. . 
As will become eviCtent In this chapter, there Is overlapb8tween the categones - e.g. an appreciation 
scheme can b8 eitheralShor'shareSettled.' 
3.1 ApprecJatlonSchemea 
The key feature of !1lost appreciiltion smemesis that they offer some form of optionallty to the 
, . . 
employee'. In suCh schEmles shares or options are ,granted or sold t() the employee at the grant date 
market value. Ultimately,thevalue received by the 8f!Iployeeis equaltoU1e net Qilln(appreCiation) of 
. , 
the, share price between the grant date and the exercise date .. · HistoricaUyappi:eclation' schemes have . . - .. .' .. , . ," .....
almost exclusively incorporated only time-based vesting conditions and some form of staggered 
. '., .." 
vesting -e.g. a third Of the grant vesting betW$en year 3 and year 5 (Bezuidenhout. 2006). Schemes 
are now starting to increasingly inCorporateperformanc&-based vestingCOt\ditions. Presented below 
are several examples of appreciation schemes with their $Peclficfeatures. 
3.1.1 Sh.,..Optlons (ESO's) 
As discussedpreviOUsly,ESQ's are effectively call options on· the shares of the respective company 
which issues them to the employee. They give the employee the right to purchase the company 
shares for the strikep,;ceon' ()I' before a particular. date in the future. Normally the, options are granted 
to the employee free of anypayment.AtypicalESQ SCheme will have the following parameters: 
• Eligibility terms 
• The maximum quantityotoptions which can b8granted to employees 
• The quantity of options granted so far to employees 
• The grant date 
• The strike prices of the options 
• The attached vestingconditlons 
• The vesting date (dates if vesting is staggered) 
• Theexpir)i date 
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. TheeligibilityterJnsdefinetheCategc)r'yoferriptoyee$eliQibleJoranESO grant. In SA historically 
ESO'shavebeen largely reserved for executlvftdirectorsand senior management. 
In the past ES<Ys havebeeti Issued With a stri.ke price ata discount to the prevailing share priceoli 
th8grantdate(Lie, 2005) and (Holman atsL, 2010).GlVentheoorpor8te seandal$lnthe US related 
to optionback:-dating and much str1ctercorporategovemance; rulesthl~ pnlCticehas largely been .. 
abandoned.StrikepriCeSar~normally set equal to the closing share price on the grant date (ATM).In 
the context of share price volatility, some companies chOse to reduce the dominahceof one sing1e 
date when it comes to setting the strike~lnstEtadtheyuseel~ an average of the· of the· closing share . 
prices over a period of ~ythe 20 days preceding the grant date, Or alternatlVely.the VWAP over a 
similar period. 
ESO'sare normally settled with shares-i.e. when the empJoyeeexercises an option which is ITM 
and has intrinsic value, they pay the strlke.price and r8c$ivesharesof the company. Interestingly. it is 
also standard practice In the US, especially In the case of financial institutions with a trading desk, for 
theemployMwishing:to simultaneoUsly exercise the option and Sell their ~hares, to issue a limit order . . 
to the desk In terms of the specific share.price level where exercise ,sf)ouldtakeplace for ITM options. 
Exercise is not . carried out until thiS Jevel is reached. When the "everis reached, the option is 
exercised and the shares are sold In the openmarketslmultaneously; thus reducing market risk for 
the employee (HoIman,2012, pars. comm.). A variation of share settlement takes place when the 
ESO Is net-settled with shares. Here Instead of paying the strike price, the employee receives an 
amount of shares with Rand value equal to the Intrinsic value of alt the options they are exerCising. 
ESO's can alSo be. settled only with cash. In this Instance, upon exercise, the company will simply pay 
the intrinsic value of the options in cash to the employee. Cash settled options are called Share 
Appreciation Rights (SAR's) and have become more and more prevalentreeelitly for a number of 
reasons. 
Dilution is an Important factor to consider when it comes. to share-based Incentive schemes. In the . 
past companies were less reticent when it came. to issulnglargeESO grants which can be highly 
dilutive~ ShareholdEM'sgloba,lly, especially large institutional ones, have gradually woken up to the fact 
that such instruments can erode the value of their shareholding and have applied Significant pressure-
on companies to design more efficient Incentive schemes (lcelY, 2006). One of the reasons why 
SAR's schemes have become more popular is Precisely because they are less. dilutive and offer more . . " .. 
flexibility to the company. Cash settled SAR's are not dilutive beCause nO new shares are Issued by 
thecornpany.That said, ~ven with a SARnet-settl~ withshares,.the amount of shares the company 
may have to issue to the employee upon exercise is on average only about 1/3rd of that for a normal 
ESO. The company also has the flexibility to ch~ebetween cash and share settlement. Another 
important reason SAR's have gained in popularity Is their tax treatment. Cash settled share-based 
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incentlvt)S eanpotenti8llybefaxdeduCtllbieiotnehallCfsofthecomPilny whHesharesettie<fonesare 
oof(I~Yi2006).· .... . 
- - . , . .' -
In this typ8 ofschefne the .employee isg~aloanbyihe company to purchase shares at prevailing 
~ . -. .,' .' . . 
mark$tv8h . le.'To eliminate credit risk, theloarlissecu~ by the emplOyeepledgii'lg theit sh8resb$Ck', 
to the company. NarmallythetOan cannot'be repaid:prtor'to a specificdat8inttte fut4i'e, Similar to a 
tirne-based"esting cOndition. Dividends ~idonthe~resmay'beUsedto reduce th~loanamoiJnt. 
One of th$ inherent disadvantagEtS of this scherne is that if thesflare price' d8ctlnes~bsequentt()the 
eAlp10yeehaylng taken the loan to purchase the share, a losS can occur: Another disadvantage is the 
'faCt that~ the Implementation of changes to_ '~' feglslatiqn,the loan _ended by the company 
• . ." ". ..." . . . .' J' . . 
to the employ" createS an ,unfavourable taxtr.tmentllithe hands of· the employee. For these 
, reasons,sudlschemesare hardly uSed any more (Bezuldenhout,2()06). 
3.1.3 Deferred Delivery Schemes 
TheSe scherries are very similar to nQrtnalESO's,exceptfor one important feature. Upon exercise, 
payment for the $h8res by the employee and thelrdeJiveryt>y' the comPany Isdeferredto,~~ future 
date. Prior to the actual delivery of the shares, the employee receives no divldef.\ds. TheSe SChemes 
were designed speclficaHy to get around SectiOn8Aof~ TaxktNo 58 of 1962 and ger,erateCGT ' 
for the employee rathertht;.ninoometax.ExercisewouldnormaltY take place shortiyaftergrantdate 
and,glventh_the option Is unlikely to be _p ITM, IIttlelncorne tax would,be paid ()ntheoption 
gain.CGT would be paid when the shares are finally paid for and delivered in several years time 
, , 
(Bezuidenllout 2006). In contrast to Section SA. in terms of Section 8e a taxable event oe:eurs upon 
". • <'
, vesting of the equity instrument andnotexerclse~ Vestirig'.wouJd not be.corisider:8d to t'!ave taken 
~~ntil all, oonditions~have be8n ~tisfiedal'ld shares have been delivered; TherefOre. with the 
arrival of Section 8C of the Act, deferred delivery schemes effectiyely became obsolete. 
3.2FuU Quantum Schemes 
Full quantum schemes:involv8 the outright Jssuance of shares to the employee at zero or par value 
(which is normally negUglble). SUChsc:hem~~nhave either time-baSed or performance b8Sed 
vestingc:onditions or both. The'main difference relative ,to ap~tion schemeS Is that there /sno 
optionaUtyln full qUantum schemes -the emplO~ receiveS the full performanCe of the share as 
opposed to thafofacaltoption on the share. ~such, thepay-offisJinear and. there is n()embedded 
\ . - '. . .... 
Ievenlge, They are more .commonlysettled with shares, bUt thereareiristanceS where a full quantum 
scheme is seWed In ca~h.Thereare als()YersionsWhere,althoughthe em~loYee receives the full 
231P ~ ge 










perform$1lC8 of the share •. dMdends are flotpaldOnth8 grant SUchanlnstrurnent,has the pay-off of 
, ..... "" .. " ..... , .. ,' .... ', .. ' ". '. .' : . . . ". ". 
a call Option~ a zero strike priCe OI"otberWlseeatled LEPO .:. Low Exercise Price Option; " 
3.2; 1 RestrlctecfShares 
. . - . 
~trictedshares.~therwith_8nceShares(seebelow)arebeCOminglncreaslnglycommon. 
Avaiuein CU~CYisawarded tohernptoyeewhich i~ therI convertecBo aquarltfty Of~hares based 
, ..' ", '", -' '. . . ~ 
on the pr$V8i1ing shat"e price at the time. of granting. ·In this If\$~nce v"tingis time based and some 
formofstaQgering is oftenputinptaQ;~ . 
3.2.2 Performance Sha .... 
Performance shares work similarly to restricted shareS. except for the fact that they:V8St based on 
certain performanceoonditions.Nonilatly there is a performance measuremenlperiod (or release 
cycte)ofusually three to five years; The final amount of shares which wiU vesttothe employee will 
depend on the extent to which thepEriorrnance conditions have been met(Bezuidenhout, 2006). 
Historically I'EHesting of performance.·condltions .was cOnsidered. acceptable .with a •. corr"ponding 
. .. .
potential extension of the vesting period to anow mOre time forconditiOl"ls 'to be met. In light of 
tightening corporate governance rules (King III Code in SA specifteally).thls ~ractice has largely 
stopped. 
Performance conditions can broadly be divided into market related and non-market related. Non-
marketretated conditions tend to be company specifiC and absolute or target-~sed. Exam pies of 
commonly usednon-market related performance conditions are (PWC, 2011): 
• TargetEPS 
• Target ROE or ROtC 
• Target EBITDA or cash flow 
A grading"system can be implemented where shares vest to the employee p[c>portionally depending 
on whether the condition is simply met, exceeded marginally or exceedsu~tantiaily. Market related 
conditions can·il8·eitherabsolute or relative. Relative conditions are Increasingly gaining in popularity. 
Examples ofmar.ket related performance conditions are (PWC, 2011): 
• Share priceretum '. 
• TSR (share price return as well as dividends paid) 
• TSR relative. to ;in industry benchmark or a bespoke basket of peer companies 











With adef8rredbonusschetnethe,employee Is encoUraged to defer,a portion of their annuar cash 
bonus'snd replaceitw!th shares which have a 'vesting period .att8ched. 1-" retu~,theemployeeis 
granted a number of SddWonal sh8resbythe company. Thevesling eooditionsof the shares can be 
either time-baSedorperf()nnance-basedorsonretimes both (lcely,2006)~Thistypeof scheme 
encourages employees .to·gtaduallybuUd a significant. equity. stake in 'the company. It 'is effectively a 
short-term i~ which can convert to a long-term one should the employee chose to do so. 
3~3Appreclatlon vs~ FuUQuantum- theD.bate ContinueS 
As mentioned previously. in thalast five or so years ESO's haver~iveda considerable amount of 
scrutiny. Originally designed 'to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders, their often 
visible failure to do so has bEMtn hard to accept Full quantum schemes have been put forward as a 
. .. . . , 
replacement and have gained in popularity; Some of·the key benefits listed by proponents are: 
• They are less dUutive. For a given value incurr~y. the employee receives fewer shares as 
opposed to options. In addition. it has been argued that optiOns were seen as ·costless· by 
, .. . . . . . . .j 
compariieswhich has led to them ,issuing excessive amounts of ESO'sto emptoyees(Jensen 
~\ at sl., 2004). However. ilis interesting to note that this assumes that investors lack the 
sophisticationlo evaluate the real cost of the J:SO's issued by companies. which is not Ukely. 
Admittedly, disclosure today is signifICantly 'improved allowing investors to discount the Value 
of ESO's even mare precisely (Booth. 2009). 
• . Following on from the fact that options have embedded gearing and offer limited loss in return 
, .' ".
for potentially unlimited gain. together with fact that companies have gone through periods·of 
excessive issuance (see above). critics of ESO's have pointed OI:.It that during bull markets 
executives have enjoyed enormous retumsat the. expense of shareholders. In this context it , 
,has bean put forward that fun quantum schemes provide a more balanced and symmetric 
pay-off. and .put managers in exactf.y the' same position as' shareholders. Another' alternative 
which has , been used by companies in the US ista cap the maximum gains which ESO's can 
offer (e,g. 125% of the strike price,· if issued ATM) (Crotty stat. 2006). 
• Actual shSres provides relatively stable incentive regardfessof the stock price. In contrast. 
thevsiue of an ESO'sis highlysens1tive to where the share price is relative to the strike price. 
If the option tsdeep ITM., it will behave similar to. a share(higtl Delta). However. if the option 
is deep OTM it will havealoYi Delta and Will largely insensitive to share price movements. In 
the past this has often forcedcomPanies,tortl-price ESO's (lower the strike price at some 
point in the life Of the option) in an attempt to restore some value and Delta in underwater 
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(OTtv1)options. This in turn has·ofteriledto~nOutcrybYsharehoiders. given that ,it runs -
" contrary to the spirit of ES(),s to start ,with-.... payfcH'Perrormance(Hallatal;, 2003). 
Full quantum schernestend toredu~rntI~~lincentivesto engage, in risky behaviour. As . 
stated·above. volatility is one of the keyinputsint() OptiOf'l valUation and Vega. is the sensitivity , 
on~option with respect ;to ch8ng&$ -in voiatiJity.'A rise in volatility 1ncreaSes ,the value of the .-
option. Ina reallife~text ATM or'slightly ~TMESO'shaVeno Intrinsic value and high 
Vega. AssUch,manager8 are Incentt'isedto ul'ldert8keriskier projects (~ncer-iSkeQuates to 
volatility) and increase the value- of their options(H~ILat a/.,2()()3). At the ,same time. 
~ocatesof stock options point out that ma,,~albehaviour can also potentiaUy become-
toocon&ervative.This canb'e sub-optinl$1 forsutflCientlydiversiftedShar~hoIders who have a 
. . . . 
preferenc8 for CEO's who maximise retumseven if it means that more individual companies 
may sUffer losses (Booth, 2009). 
• Several studies have Indicated that ,managers WI1o' hold options tend to favour share 
repu~ases above dividend payments.~inceoptions 'do not entitle the holder to dividends~ 
Therefore, an actual s~reholding through a fun quantum share scheme can provide. an 
incentive to pursue a more balanced dividend poliCy for managers (Hall afa/., 2003): 
Although ftJIlquamum schemes seem toaffer some distinct advantages, they certainly also have a 
Cost attached'andftwould be simplistic toassunle thatth'eyca~ automatically replace appreciation 
schemes. It is; however, evident that they have becor1ie more popular and ESO issuance has 
deClined globaHy(PWC, 2011). 1t is likely 'that this trend Will continue and that companieS will invest 
more time designing more SpecifIC schemes to attain cerlainintemalstaffing goals ,and performance 
targets. 
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Chapter 4 - Accounting Treatrrient of Share-baaed IncentlYM 
j 
,Expensing of shar&-based payh1entincompanyfinancialsbecame mandatory In terms of the revised 
Statement of AnancialAccounting StandardsNC);123(SFAS 123R) In the US and thelntemational 
'Financial Reporting Standard 2 (IFRS2) glObally in 2005. Provided ~O!'is, briefhfstory of the 
. ..' 
acoounting treatment of share-based incentives prior to the arrival of these standards. 
·4.1 United Stat .. 
In 1972 the AccQunting Principles Board. (APB)I" the US, the predecessor to the FASS, issued a 
stafldardcaned APB Opinion No. 25 (APB25). APB 25 was criticised forpresCrlbingin<xmsistent 
treatment·for similar instruments (Sacho,2OO3). ItbroadlycategOfisedineentive plans into fixed and 
variable based onthe level ofcertairityofthequantity of shares to be issued and other Parameters. It 
specifledthatthSt for fixed ESO plans, (where the share quantity, the strike price and the vesting date 
are known from thEt onset) only theintJ:jnsic value,if any, was to be expensed in the company income 
statement on a straight line over the vEi$ting period. This meant that zero expense would be 
recognised by the company on ESO'sissuedATM or OTM. Conversely, forvarla/"s plans ('Nherethe 
number of shares is not fixed on grant date-e.g. SAR·sor performal'1ce.bas8(fEso's) an expense 
. would have to be recognised regardless of the moneyness of the option. Consequently, in order to 
, . 
capitalise on this accounting ,loophole and recognise zero expenses, the majority of· US companies 
adopted the practice of,lssuing ATM 'or OTM' EsC's under fixed plans, in the proce$s .. artificially 
inflating'earnings and sacrifICing performance-based conditions (Sacha, 2003). 
In 1995, FASB Statement No. 123 (SFAS 123) was issued. It recommended the recognition of the fair 
value of ESO's In financial statements by using Black~hoIes or sl~UarmethodolOgyandexpenslng. 
this fair value over the vesting period .. However, having been subject to poIiticatpiessure and lobbying 
from' US companies, it still allowed the use of the APB 25 methodology (grant day intrinsic vafue).tf a . . . , . -
company chose to continue to use APB 25, the effects of ESO's on profit and EPS had to be ' 
disclOsed in a note to thefiriancial stalements as if the fair value method. had been used. Needless to, 
say, most companies in US chose this discJosure-on/yaltemative (Sach,o, 2003). As accouriting 
scandals began to unfold (e~g. Enron andWorId.com), however, more and more companies beg~n 
using the fair value expensing method. 
In late 2004, theFASB released the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 Revised ~ 
SFAS 123R.1t superseded both APe 25 and SFAS 123 and bec8meeffeCtlve on Jun~15" 2005. It 
effectively madefair-v~lue measurement and expen~ngof share-based pa~ents mandatory in the 
US. 
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.4.2Intemation8l Financial ReportingStanci8rds.Share8asedPayments (IFRS2) 
Until 2000 the accounting rules in moStd8velop8d coun~ presc:ribed~ disclosure approach for 
dealing with share-based paymentstoemploY$eS.South Afric8was alsonoexceptK)n. AC 1.16-
. . ". . . . . ~ . -. . '. . . . . . . 
EmAfoyeeBenefitsstipulateddiScloSulltof'the detail$of Share-basedincenQves9hemes used by SA· 
. conlpanies, as wall as the dilution effect onEPs, ho\yeyer, recognitionarld expensing was not 
mandatOry (Sacha, 2003). In July ~OOO, the IASB and the accounting ~atdSboards of the US, 
. UK, AUstralia •. Canada and N_Zeelandi~e(J a joint dlsa..ssion papefWh~proposedthat where 
shares or share options are issued to ,employees as compen~tion,the fair value of these grants 
should be expensed. As part of setting common accounting standards in Europe and globally, in 2001 
. . 
thelASBadded aprojecttoitSagendathat would lead to an expo$\Jredr8ft(ED). In 2002 ED 2-
Share-based Payments was releaSed for corhments. This ultimately resulted. in the publishing of 
. IFRS2 .. Share-based PaymenbsWhlchcameintotorC:e in~an~ 2005 and waS also adopted in 
South Africa. The overall approach is broadly similar toSFAS1~3R. In terms of IFRS2 share-based 
• '. ! -.... . 
paymentstoemployeesarefair:Yaluedon grant date and are charged throUgh the Income statement 
oyer the vesting period (Zheng, 200!). 
4.3 IFRS2 .... Basic Framework 
What ftpes ·of share;basec;l R!Ymeots· are covered? 
IFRS2 coyersa wider spectrum of payments than simply those to employees. It covers all of forms of 
share-based payments for goocIs8nd services supplied to. the"reporting entity (Hem, 2006), Including: 
• Employee share or share option schemes -. employees are defined widely and include others 
. providing Similar services· 
• Share-based payments.to parties other than employees who have supplied goods or services 
to the entity 
• Payments to be settled in cash or other assets at amounts which depend on share values • 
(e.g. SAR's) 
Hgw am ShaCJ:basld .RJOOne.ots a tpgorisE[(il7 
Shar&-basedpayments are divided into three basic types (Hem, 2006): 
1. Equity-settled:wJlere.Qoodsand services are paid for with sllares or share options . . . . .. '. ". . . . , .' 
2. Cash-settl'ed: wh.-e inretum. for· receiving goods and services the entity incurs a UabUity for 
amounts based onthe,prIce of the entity's shares 
3. Transactions whiCh maybe Settled with either cash or equity at either party's 'discretion 
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How Is fair value musured? 
In terms· of transactions with . employees, IFRS2 states· that the expense· should ·.be measured· on the 
. . - . -
date on which the equity Instruments ar8grantedand should be based on the fair value of the equity 
InstrumentsgrantecfsJnce Ills usually 00t possible to estlmatereliably~falrvalue of the employee's 
services (Bezuiden~t;· 2006); Market prices .. shOUld be . used where they are avallable.l~ the 
absence ofooservablemarket priCes, a valuation technique such as an option pricing model should 
beused.IFRS2 doesnotspecify a partICular valuation mod8l.·ltdoes,·however, r.;quire techniques to 
. . 
be consistent with generally accepted . valuation. methods and ~corporate all factors and assumptions 
that· knowledgeable and .. ·willing parties Should. consider. EstablIShed .models developed to value 
exchange tradedoptio~ such asBS, Binomial TreeS and Me may need to be modified to reflect the 
specific characteristics of ESO's (Hem,· 2006). 
HOW are egulty;.settlecfinstruments treated? 
The fair value of equity-settJed instruments which do not vest until certain conditions have been met is 
calcuJated on the grant date and is expensed in the income statement over the vesting period (or until 
all~nditions have been met). with a credit to shareholder's fun<1$. The fun value of grants with no 
vesting con~itions Is expensed immediately. ltis important to notet~-the.fair value of equity-settJed 
instruments Is not re-estimated at each reporting date. Only the estimate of the extent to which 
vesting conditions are expected to be met In order to determine the numberof options/shares used In 
. the calculations is updated (see treatment of vesting conditions below) (Hero, 2006). 
How are cash=stttJed instruments treated? 
The fair' value of the liability resulting from cash,.settled ins~mentS is measured on grant date and is 
expensed over the vesting period (if any). In contrast to equity,.settJed·instruments, thisfafr value Is re-
estimated at each reporting date and the liability Is adjusted -"tiue-up. method. 
WlJrt is the patmef)tpf awards with iI cab or equity altemat!vt? . 
In the presence of awards with a settlementaltematlve, the entity aCcounts for them either as equity . 
or cash-settled (charge to. the income statement and debit to equity or liabilities) based on the entity's 
estimate of likely settlement and past practice with similar transactions (Herri, 2006). 
: ~ '-" .._.. .. 
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How are veslin\l9Q(\Q·ti~~ treated? 
Vesting conditions are broadly divided into marlvA·basoo aoo non-mark~l-bas~d. Examples of 00rl-
market-based vestir>g conditions are time·based (l ength of service) vesting, as well as EPS, revenue, 
EBITDA, ROE, ROle internai company targets. Ma--ket-based vesting conditions a--e normally related 
to too share price of the company Or other observable market rates (&hare prices, indices, etc) 
Examples are share price return, TSR, TSR relative to peer companies Or an established ma--ket 
ber>Chmark. 
Non-market"based conditions are rIOt taken into account into estimating too fair value of the 
instrument at grant date. Instead, at each reporting date the entity ooeds to re-estimate the nl)l11ber of 
instruments expected to vest and make adjustments if necessary so that ul\lmately the amount 
expensed shollid be based on the actual rnJmber of instruments which t1ave vested Such 
adjustments are based on the best available estimates. 
Market-based conditions are taken into account into estimating the fair value of too instrument at 
grant date. The number of instruments expected to vest is not subsequently re-estimated at each 
reporting date arid "",ther is the expected vesting period (if the tength of this period is subject to a 
market·based corldition) 
Figure 1 _ Diagram summarising the treatment of vesting conditions (Deioitte, 20(7) 
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IFRS2 does not prescribe a speclflC method Whenitcom~toestimating valuaUonmodei inputs. . - - ',' . . . . . . . . ".' 
These are Ieflto the entity to estimate, provided that ,the methodology ~'reasonable and is based on 
, ' " /, " " , 
, acCepted market practice. For instance, e~,vo1atility may be measured by reference to Implied 
, ,v0t8tility observed frorn' exchangetrad8doptions~ 'In the absence, of a 'liquid options market on the 
shares of the company, given the mean reverting nature of volatility, historical volatility can, also be 
used. Alternatively, a combinatiOn'impliedand historical'volatility may be.applied; Assurnptlons about 
expeCted dividends should be b8sedonpublicty available information. If the company has never paid ' 
dividends and does not expect to do so In the future, then an ~pected dividend yield of zero can be' 
assumed. For an entity which pays dividends, the historical pattern of increases can be considered. 
The nSk-free interest rate 'can be the yield implied from zero COUpon govemmentbonds with the same 
maturity as the Instrument. 
4.4 Implications of IFRS2 
As is evident from the, tFRS2 framework, there are arnultitude of Implications for companies choosing 
which type of share-ba~ incentive scheme to implement. The IFRS2-treatmentof,share-based 
payments is not withOut its critics. A number of potential.issueshave been put forward by detractors 
of the standard. 
No re-e§wnation of inputs and fair vatu, for eguity-§ettfe,9 iO§truments 
The fact that the fair-value of equity-settled instf!Jments is only calculated on the grant date and ,is not 
re-estimated on subsequent reporting dates artificially exaggerates the importance of grant date 
inputs such as the stock price, votatility and interest rates (Bulow at a/., 2005). For companies with 
ESO's with a vesting period of 3 to 5 years this can create a substantial distortiOn of the reported 
earnings. If the share price rises over the vesting period, the ESO's win become more valuable and 
. the company wilt' be overstating earnings. If the share price declines, earnings will be understated. 
Similarly, the ESC's will have noticeable vega exposure. If volatility Increases, again earnings will be 
overstated and if it decreases earnings will be understated. For example an, ESO's with an expected 
" ' 
life of 5 years will have a Delta of approx. 75% and a Vega;Of approx. 2%. This means thatfor every 
R 1 in the share price the vatue of the option will increase by R O. 75~ It also meamsthat for every 1 % 
. . " . .". '. 
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• The IFRS2 prescribed methodology for expensingshare-basedincentl~issimiliir to the commonly 
, " 
used method" for valuing a diverse, pool' of mortgages. As such, a significant amount of, subjective 
estimates of emploYee behaviour, such'as attr~onrates' andpotentialfor~rlyexerciseneed to be 
made by the company. In this context,.the suggested remedies to alleviate the weaknesses ofmodels 
such as as and CRR Binomial tr8es often appear arbitra~ For, instance~ IFRS2sUggeststhat,the 
option Ufe as used by the model is reduced to an expected option life which is a gross 
oversimplification (van Zyl ata/:; 2007). 
The eX8Q98@ted ImP2rtaoceof thevestinooeriod 
According to IFRS2 exper;'lsing of share-based payments should take place during the vesting period 
even though much of the value of instruments may attributable to employment after the vesting date. 
Options ,generally do not provide much 'of a retention incentive when they are deep ITM or deep OTM 
on the vesting date. However,they represent a tangible benefit to the employee when at or near ,the 
money on the vesting date (Bulow at BI., 2005). 
The treatment of eauity-settled and cash-seWed instrume,;" Is different 
This creates a potential dilemma for the company when It comes to designing an appropriate scheme. 
On the one hand, a. cash;.settled scheme together with frequent true-up of fair value will ensure that 
the valuation remains grounded In reality. On the other hand, an equity-settled scheme translates to 
, . 
less volatile earnings. 











" Chapter 5- Tax , Treatment Of Sha .. baaed Incentives 
Tax related matlersarising ~om share-based incentives aredealtwlth by Sections SA, 88 and 8C of 
the Income Tax Act No 58, 1962 (the Act). Sections SA and 8Cdealmainlywithgeneral option and 
share, schemes While ,Section 88 deals with broad-based. empowerment share plans. For the 
purposes of this study, only ,Sections 8A and 8C are ~lnaIYsed.Section8Cwas introduced In October 
. . . ' . . 
2004 as away for theSARS to curb the proliferation of shares schemeswbich were engineered to get 
around the stipulations of Section SA and minimiSe tax In th8 hands of the employee. ' 
5.1 SectIon 8A 
, Section SA was introduced into the Act in 1969 and became effectlve'in1970.lt applies to all rights to 
acquire mar1<etable securities, granted to employees before October 2004. Section '8C applies .from 
October 2004 OJ'lwards.tn'an explanatory memorandum In 2004, SARS explained that ,Section '8A 
had failed to keep up with the myriad of equity-basedincentives developed by companies and atso 
the appreciation ofrefated marketable securities as part Of ordinary income (Bezuidenhout, 20(6). 
In terms of Section 8A,there is no tax event when securities are granted ()r when they vesl However, 
tax consequences ariSe when there is exercise,ces$ion or release of the securities. Any revenue gain 
from the difference between the market value of the shares upon exercise and the consideration paid 
_'. ' I . ')
for the options/shares' needs to, be included is then ,subject to income 'tax for the relevant tax years in 
the hands oftheernployee. Also, In co.ntrast with Section 8C,Sectlon SA does allow the deduction of 
') , 
losses. Where the shares acquired as a result of exercise, cession or release are subject to disposal 
re$trictlons, the employee can ,chOse to defer the payment of tax ~ntn such date when the restrictions 
fall away and the shares can be disposed of. Any loans from the employer to the employee f~ the' 
payment of any consideration would give rise to taxable benefit ~Bezuidenhout, 2006). 
The fact that in terms of Section SA a taxable event occurs at exercise, cession or release, resulted in 
the proliferation of tax efficient incentive schemes such as, deferred delivery schemes. With such 
schemes the ESC Is exercised very early (almost Immediately after grant date) which leads to a small 
taxable gain, taxed on income. Subsequent to e~ercise, the deliverY and payment for, the shares Is 
deferred to a later date at Which point only CGT is normaUy paid by the employee. It is likely that such 
schemes one of the reasons why SARS Introduced Section 8C in 2004 (Bezuidenhout, 2006). 
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In contra, st to SA, in terms of Section 8Cataxableevent occurs upon vesting of the equ, ityinstrument . . . ... 
and not f;txercise.The emPtoyeeneedsto include in their income any gain or dedudanylosswith 
respect to the vesting of such instruments.SectionSCfurther differemiates between r&strictfKJ, and 
unrestrictedinstrumen~. For Instruments subject to restrictions; vesting and a corresponding tax' 
event takes place'af the earliest ,oflapslngofallrestrictiofls, disposal, termination or death. 
Unrestricted instruments vest at the time of granting. Vesting does not take place ,if~ restricted 
instrument is disposed offer ano~. ThEt ultimate disposal of the shares (normally having been 
" received as part of an appreciation or a full ' quantum SCheme) may result In either capiUlJ or revenue 
, '. 
gain, depending on the intention of the employee (Zheng; 2007). 
The fIgUre' below is after Zheng(2007) and summarises the tax implications for the employee in terms 
of Sections SA and 8C: 





Sectlon8A U"rWtricted Restriction on 'both options and 
options options only .hares or.ha .... 
only 
Grant No tax effect No distinction No tax effect No tax effect 
between granting 
and vesting. Gain Gain (or loss) 
(or loss) arising arising from the 
~ from thedifferehce difference betWeen 
between markel market value of the 
value of the option , option at the time it 
at the time of , vests and any 
Option vesting No tax effect 
granting and any consideration paid . 
No tax,effect 
consideration paid . for the' optIOn is, 
for the option is, Included (or 
includ~(or dedUcted from) In 
dedUQtedfrom) In the employee's 
the employee's taxable income and 
taxable Income-and Is sUbject to income 




No tax effect No taxetrect ' No tax effect 
Income tax on the ' 
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differance~ -\ , 
, . the market value of 
the shares at the 
time of exercise and 
the consideration 
paid for the shares 
and the options. 
Gain (or loss) 
arising from the 
difference between 
market value of the 
$hares at the time 
all conditions lapse 
Lapse of 
and any 
restriction on No tax effect No tax effect No tax effect 
. consideration paid 
, for the oJ?tion and 
the shares 
the shares is 
included (or 
deducted from) In 
the employee's 
'taxable income and 
, is subject to income 
tax. 
The cflfferance The difference 
The difference The difference 
between the sale between the sale 
- between the sale between the sale proceeds and the ~, proceeds and the 
proceeds and the proceeds and the 
base cost of the base costof the 
Sale of shares base cost of the base cost of the shares is treated shares is treated 
(assuming 
shares is treated shares is treated 
and taxed as capital and taxed ,as capital 
and taxed as capital 'and taxed as capital 
~Igaln gain. The base cost . gain. The base cost 
gain. The base cost 'gain. The base cost 
treatment) will be the market 
will be the market will be the market 
will be the market 
value of the shares value of the shares 
value pf the shares value of the shares 
on the date when 
ontheexerase on the option grant 
on the date when 
the restrictions on the restrictions on 
date. date. 
the options lapse. the shares lapse. 
5.3 Tax Deductibility of Share-based Payments 
'Another importantf,actor to consider is how share-based incentive schemes are taxed in the hands of 
the company issuing the scheme. Normally 'in countries ,such as ,Canada, UK and New Zealand 
share-based payments to employees Constitute a deductable expense for the company. No such legal 
precedent exists in South Africa (Bezuidenhout, 2006). 










Genera"y, to claim. an. income. tax deduction· several conditiOns ··need·to be satisfied (Bezuldenhout, 
. . .' '. . . , 
.2006): 
• Expenditure or loses must actually be incurred; 
•. In the productic>." of income; 
• Suchexperl~iture and losses must not be of capital nature; 
• The expenditure and losses must be incurred for the purposes oUrade. 
In this context, the incurring of expenditure and losses is more easilyjustifia~ in instances where the 
scheme is either settled with cash or wi~ shares which are purchased by the company in the open 
market. Conversely, it is more d~cultto justify expenditure and tosses where the scheme is settled 
with the issuing of new shares. This adds another layer of complexity in addition to the IFRS2 
\ 
accounting treatment when it comes to designing a ~based incentive scheme. It is also 
.' 
potentially the reason why cash and net share settled SAR schemes have gained in popularity in the 
past several years. 











Chapter 6 _ Results and Findings 
This chapter outlines in detail the various sham-based incentive schemes used by the 50 companies 
chosen for this study, tOj;lether with some 01 the specific parameters incorporated in thMe schO!mes. II 
also sO!rvO!s to idMtify particular trends in terms of, among others, preferrO!d schemes types and 
method of settlO!ment, general si~e 01 schemes relative to isslJed share capital, thO! diffO!rent types of 
vesting conditions applied to schemes and the valuation models used. 
6.1 Prevalent Scheme Types 
Of the 50 companies examined only 2 companies do not make use of sh<lre-based incentive schemes 
_ Assore Ltd and Reinet Investments CSA. Both companies are investment holding companies which 
invest in other listed or unlisted companlO!s They do not operate the companies they h"d. have 
minimal staff component and, as such, share-based incentives are not seen as a necessary 
ingrO!dient in their remuneration structure The othO!r 48 cornpaniO!s all use some form of long-term 
share-based iocO!ntives. 
Figure 3 below illustrates the broad use of appr~iation-t~ schemes vs. full quantum schemes. 





Appr ~cI'lion «lIem~ 
~" 
Broad scheme usage breakdown 
Fullquantum "heme ,., BOlh 
At lirst glance. it 00e5 not become apparMt thai fuW 'l'Jantum schemes have become more pop<Jlar in 
recent years. HowO!ver, th O! 28 companies (56% 01 total) which make use 01 both types of schemes 
need to be scrulinised a little lurther 01 these 28 companiO!s, 11 companies have indicated Ihat they 
have effectivO!ly discontinued their existing appr~ialion schO!mes with no lurther issuaoce 01 











in the next several years and are already being replaced entirely by 1<.111 quantum schemes. This 
means that the perC€ntage 01 lull quantum sctiemes is currently understated . II the appreciation-type 
schemes these 11 companies still have are excluded from ttie data, a different picture appears. 
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Ttie figure above indicates that lull quantum schemes are irdeed gaining in popularity This is lurther 
supported by data collected lor 70 JSE ' sted companies by Towers Perrin in a report on global 
'illcentives published in 2005 (Towers Perrin, 2(05). At that point, 55 or the 70 companies surveyed 
(or 79%) were still using exclusively appreciation-type share-based iocentive schemes. The data also 
points to the fact that traditional ESO's have experienced a signilicant decline Fig.Jre 5 bellow shows 
that of ttie 50 companies analysed, only 3 companies (or 6%) use exclusively a traditional ESO 
scheme. 
figure 5 - Types of appreciation schemes 
Typesof appreciation scheme, 
'"' 
SAR on lV Bot h (SO Jr>d SAR 










The companies who either exclusively u~e SAR's or I:>oIh SAR's and ESO's are also relatively few As 
prBViously mentklned, SAR's offer certain t>enefit~ Over ESO's, namely less dilutioo and in instarlCes 
where they are cash settled _ potentially a favooral:>le tax treatment. In the few ye~rs ~fter the 
introduction of Section Be of the Income Tax Act and also IFRS2, they were often seen as ~ 
replacement to traditional ESO's (Icely, 2000). Thi s is also supported by the fact that a numt:>er of the 
companie~ examfied as part of this study indicate that they have migrated thei r old ESO schemes 
into SAR's around that period. That oong said, the general picture which seems to emerge is one of 
gradual evolution from ESO schemes to either SAR's or both SAR's and lull qu~ntum schemes. 
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Restricled ,hareo 
TVpesof full quantum schemes 
Performance shares Both 
k; Figure 6 alxwe i lustrates, of the 36 companies (12% of total) wrfch use full quantum schemes 
(either exdusively or together with ar>Preciation schemes), the overriding majority (30 companies or 
60'% of total) make use of perfO"mance share~ . Another 5 companies use restricted shares and 1 
company uses both restricted and performance shares In 2005, Towers Perrin reported that only 5 of 
the 70 South African compan es surveyed (or 7'",) were using perlO"m~nce shares ~s p~rt of 
remuneration (Tow","" Perr"" 2005), It is very interesting to see what a significant number of 
companies have adopted the use of perfO"mance shares over the last 5 - 6 years, 
Companies today are faced with ~ multitude of competing objectives in terms remuneration 
Examples are staff retention, ~Iigning incentive~ of managers with those of shareholders, meeting 
short, medium and long-term strategic goals, In this context, there has !)een a gradual move away 
from the ' ooe size fit~ air approach. More time is spent on the design of share-based incentive 
schemes and companies are starting to use combinations of &Chernes (PV'IC, 2(11). Of the 50 
companies ooalysed (excluding ones which have residual ESO and SAR schemes, oot have indicated 
that they are moving exclusively to full quantum schemes) , 19 (or 38%) oper~te more than one basic 
type of scheme. In addition, the overriding majority of comp~nies oper~te a multitude of different 











employee groups, What is also apparent is the distinct compl""ity of plans used by large multinatiorJal 
companies Noticeable also is the more complex and elaborate nature 01 plans used by lirJancial 
institutions compared to those of retail or manufacturi,,!) companies for ""ample. In the aftermath of 
the globallinancial cnsis, financial institutions have been subject to m<Jch closer scrutiny in terms of 
employee and executive remuneration, risk taking behaviour and misalignment of incentive. It is likely 
that this has potentially resulted in a more rapid transformation c( their incentive structures and has 
led to more varied share-based incentives aiming to address previous inconsistencies as well as to 
appease regulators and the general public. 
6.2 Settlement Method 
It is interesting to see that the majority of the 48 companies which operate long-term share based 
incentive schemes settle those sdlemes with shares. 






As mentioned in Chapter 5, cash settlement has the potential to offer tax deductibil ity to the company 
of the resulting scheme expense. However, due to the lack of legal precedent in South Africa, this is 
not ~aranteed and certain conditions need to be satisfied f irst (Bezuldenhout. 2(06). Therefore 
although at first glance one would expect tax efficiency to be an imprxtant cons ideration for any 
company, the proliferation of share settled schemes could be indicative of other factors which might 
be at play 
The simple lact that full Quantum schemes have become sO dominant is potentially one of the reasons 
why share settlement is prevalent. As discussed in Chapter 3, full Quantum schemes and 












incentives,. compared to ESO's. Even net share ~ed SAR's offer less dUutionthan standard share 
settled ESO's. Another potential reason· is Ute fact that· share settled schem~ are nQtfair valued after 
they are granted in succeeding reporting periods and, as a result, introduce less volatility in the 
income statement (see Chapter 4 for lFRS2 discussion). 
6.3 Size ofShare-baHd Incentive Sche.,.. 
Of the 48 companies which operate long-term share based incentive schemes, 25 disclose the 
maximum amount of shares that can be issued as -part of their share-based incentive schemes. Of 
these 25 companies, 23 form part of the FTSElJSE Top 4olrldex' and another 2 companies form part 
of the sample with tower market capitalisation. 
In percentage terms relative to total issued shares, the average maximum aHowabie scheme size for 
all 25 companies is .11.5%. The 2 companies which are not· TOP40 Index constituents have larger 
maximum allowable scheme sizes - average of 18.1%. Taken at faCe value, the average permissible 
scheme size numbers are cause for concern. They are Indicative of the potential for significant dilution· 
if used to the maximum. However, one needs to examine the current usage further. Of the companies . . 
currently operating long-term share based incel'ltive schemes, 44 disclose the ·actual. usage of the 
maximumal~ble scheme size (of these 36 are part of theTOP40 Index and 8 are not). This is 
provided via the quantity of shares which ttle company .. may have to· issue,should all vesting 
conditions for all instruments were to be satisfied and all instruments were exercised at the end of the . 
reporting period. As such, the actual usage for all 44cornpanies is quite loW relative to issued share 
capltat- 3.1 %. It is again higher for non-members of the TOP40 Index - 6.3%. Usage relative to. 
maximum anowable size (for all the 25 companies who disclose maximum allowable numbtM's) is 
24.5%. 
Overall, the picture which emerges from the data is one of relatively contained. usage of share-based 
incentive schemes. In line with global trends (PVVC, 2011), JSE listed companies are clearly 
cognisant of the dilutlve effect of share-based payments and, consequently, tend to be relatively 
sparing with the size of their incentive schemes .. 
6.4 Vesting Rates,V .. tlng Periods and Tenor 
Long-term share-based incentive schemes by definition have built in vesting periods. Historically the 
period has served as an employee retention tool, but as of more recently, with the proliferation of 
performance conditions, this is also the period during which such conditiOns can be measured .. 












~Iy,· vesting can be divided into cliff-type vesting . where the entire scheme tranche will vest, or 
staggered vesting where portions of the same tranche will vest in Successive Years (e.g. in 3, 4 and 5 
years after grant date). 
There appears to be a noticeable difference between the type of vesting ·incorporated.· into 
appreciation schemes as opposed to full quantum. schemes, as evidenced by data from the 48 
companies exan:lined. Cliff vestflg is dominant among full quantum schemes, whereas staggered 
vesting dominates among appreciation type schemes. Staggered vesting normally commences 2 or 3 
years after grant date and the most widelyus~ methods are either vesting rates of 33% over 3 years 
or 25% over 4 years. Cliff vesting in most instances takes place 3.years after grant date. In cases 
where a full quantum scheme cliff vests and also has more than one performance condition/criteria, 
the respective tranche Is split into portions assigned to each condition. For example: 
• vesting takes place in 3 years 
• 50% of tranche will vest if 5% HEPS growth is achieved over the 3 year period 
• the other 50% of tranche will vest if TSR is above that of a group of peer companies over the 
3 year period 
Given that shares' are perpetual instruments, by definitiOn, in the case of full quantum schemes 
vesting and expiry effectively coincide. Expiry for appreciation Instruments tends to take place 6 to 10 
years after grant date. The average tenor for appreciation schemeS used by the JSE companies 
examined in this study is 8.2 year1s, whereas the average tenor for those with full quantum schemes is 
3.2 years. It is interesting to note that the extended tenor of appreciation schemes can lead to 
increased dilution and drag on shareholder value, given that options have the potential to go very 
deep ITM over a 10 year period. As such, again, it is not sUrprising to see that full quantum schemes 
with a reduced tenor have grown in prominence. 
6.5 Performance, Conditions 
Of the. 48 companies which operate long-term share based incentlvesche,mes, 11 companies do not 
use performance conditions of any kind and 8 companies mention·, but do not disclose the 
performance conditions they use. Of the 25 companies who both use and disclose performance 
conditions, 15 companies (or 52%) use two criteria (e.g. total shareholder return - TSR and headline 
earnings per share - HEPS). Another 2 companies (or 7%) use three criteria. The criteria used are 
predominantly market-based with non-market bas8d intemal targets being present, but to a smaller 
degree. Normally in instances Where the company uses more than one criterion, it is' often a 
combination of a market-based and a non-market bSsed internal target. 
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Fillure 8 _ Different criteria used in performance condilions 
Criter ia for performance conditions 
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As Figure 8 above iiluslrales, lotal shareholder return (TSR) and simply shareholder relurn (SR) are 
lhe mosl popular benchmarks used by companies TSR and SR are relative markel-based 
performance conditions and are cormally compared 10 Ihose of eilher an eslablished industry index or 
a besroke basket of fl""r companies. Non-market absolute performance cond illons are also popular 
with headl ine earnings per share (HEPS) and earnlrJ\ls per share (EPS) belrJ\l most frequently used, 
In instances where an absolute non-market condltKln is present there is cormally an internally set 
target wtlich needs to be attained during the vesting per>Od (e g. HEPS annual growth needs to be 
5%), or a hurd le rate needs to be overcome (e,g. HEPS annual growth needs 10 be above CPI) , In 
general , performance conditions are much more frequently associated with full quantum schemes 
(and performance shares specifICally) , although some of the more recently issued SAR's schemes 
also on occasion have embedded performance conditIOns, It also interesting to note that several 
companies indicate that they have performed reviews of the performance conditions in their schemes 
and, as a result, have decided to apply more stringent criteria. For instance, simply attaining TSR 
equal to that 01 peer companies does not necessarlly mean that that vest,ng w~1 take place It is 
outperlormance that leads to vesting and the more the benchmark IS outperformed the lar\l6r part of 
the trancoo vests . 
6.6 Share Price on Grant Date 
As menboned preVIOUsly, studies have indicated that prior to troe introduction of the SOX Act and 
IFRS2 a number 01 option gants in too US and also other countries globally had been timed 
retroactively by back-dating the strike price, thus artlfiaally inflaling lhe option pay-off and, in the 











process, robbing·comPariy.shareh01ders. 'of value (Lie, 2005;aooHolman at a/., 2010). ThisP.raCtice 
, •• • > 
has been eradicated ~nd companies are now forced to pr~idesignificantly more disclosure of the 
, , 
specific details of their share-based incentives,. incfudlng·the ref8rence share price used to determine 
strikes and share quantities-. 
Of the 48 companies who 'operate long-term share based, incentive schemes, the majority use the 
share price on the grant date. Strike prices 'are set ATM(none of the companies indicate that they set 
strikes at a discount to the prevailing share~) except in instances where the option is a low 
exerciSe price option (LEPO) and effectively has a strike of zero. Other methods used to determine 
the reference price are: 
• share price on t~ date before grant date 
• an average cfosing share price over period preceding the grant date (normaUy 5 to 20 days) 
• . WlAP over period preceding the grant date (nonnally5 to 20 days) 
Incidentally the last two methods are very robust and would certainly be the preferred choice in terms 
of eliminating any chance of shilre price manipulation. In addition, they ensure that the reference price 
is to a lesser extent subject to volatility and gen8rat short-term market sentiment. 
'6.7 Model. 8nd ModeI.lnputs 
6.7.1 Option Pricing Models 
The models most frequently used by the companies· which form part of this study are, predictably, 
Black-Scholes, Binomial and Monte Carlo. One company mentions the use' of Berm",dan modei, 
which is likely to be an adaptation of the Binomial model~ The Black-Schoies. model is used mainly for 
standard appreciation schemes (ESO'sand SAR's) excfusjvelywith time-based vesting (i.e. no 
performance conditions). 1n such instances, an expected life of the option is normally calculated by 
· )....
the company to account for the possibility of early exerciSe. The more versatile Binomial model also 
tends to be associated with more standard ESO and 8AR schemes with time-based vesting. 
Unfortunately, in most instances discfosure ·is not sufficient to determine whether and how early 
exercise is incorporated into· the binomial tree, except in one instance. The company In question 
applies a strike multiple of 2~5to a Binomial model when valuing' ESO's. If the multiple is reached at 
or after vesting, the model assumes that the option will be exerciSed. This is conceptually analogous 
to the Hull-White model described in Chapter 2· and is perhaps one of the mOre ingenio~~ uses of the 











The Monte carto model is uniformly used. to fair value complex sch8mes with market-based 
performance conditions such as relative TSR. it is interesting to note at this point that an instrument 
~ fair value is contingent on the outperformance of one. underlying asset over another will have 
sensitivity to not only the volatility of the.two assets; but also the correlation between them . Yet none 
of the companies with schemes cont@lning market-based based performance conditions mention the 
. use of correlation as an Input into the Monte Carlo model. 
One company also indicates that the valuation of their schemes isoutsourced to an external party. 
Another company indicates that they use the valuation provided by the bank which also provides them 
with hedging instruments for their schemes. 
6.7.2 Volatility 
The overriding major~ of companies who form part of this study use historical volatility as an input to 
their respective models. In most cases, the term of historical volatility used equates to the term of the 
instrument (e.g; if the ESO/SAR has a 5 year terra, then 5 year historical volatility Is used). In some 
instances the historical volatility term is adjust to match that of the expected life of the option as 
determined by the company. In. addition, four companies apply either simple or exponential moving 
averages . to historical volatility possibly In an attempt to place more emphasis on more recent 
historical volatility as opposed to volatility further back in time. Only one Company mentions the use of 
6 month implied volatility as derived from SAFE>< traded options. This is somewhat surprising, given 
that the Company in question operates a LEPO-based scheme and, as such, the instruments (being 
zero strike calls) have no sensitivity to volatility. 
6.7.3 Expected Life 
There Is relatively little disclosure surrounding the methodology used to calCl,lIate an expected life for 
ESO's and SAR's by the companies in this study. The ones who mention the fact that an e~ed life 
is supplied to.the model simply indicate that .it is a management estimate, based on hisforical 
experience. In several Instances, doser inspection of some of the supplied dates and other 
parameters, suggests that the· expected life may not be calculated - i.e .. the more conservative 
approach of using the actual term of the option may be used. 
6.7.4 Interest Rate 
Interest rates are decidedly the single model input which presents the least problems in terms of 
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bank sYiaps, go out to 30 years and, more. With very few exceptions, the majority of comPanies use 
. . \' ' -" .,., . 
-the interestratecorrespondtng with the maturity of the Option derived from zero coupon SoUth African 
gOvernment bonds. Four companieS indicate that they . use theinter-4)ankswap. rate corresponding 
-with the maturity of the option. This Is the . moreteehnically correctm~· in the· sense that the 
company writing the options is ·untikely to have a credit rating equ~1 to that of the SA government and, 
as such, swap rates provide abetterj)roxy for the credit risk of the company. In fact, the most 
technically correct method would be for the company touse its own borrowing costwithsimifarterm 
. .." . , .' . 
as a modet input. Conversely. using the fowerzero coupon government bond rates tends to overvalue. 
the can option and, in this respect, provides a more cOOSerYative accountlngestlm •. this is more 
pronounced for longer dated options. 
6.7.5 Dividend Estimates 
Again, disclosure related to dividend estimation is not particularly significant Management estimates 
based on historical experience Is most often quoted as the method for deriving dividend estimates. 
This in itself is not necessarily problematic, given the ~ that, unUke Interest rates, volatility and early 
. -
exercise patterns, management does actUally have control. over ~e. company. dividend policy. One 
company indicates the use of a dlvldendcovermultlple. ttis not, however, clear how the company in 
question estimates the growth of their earnings on the dividend payout will be Contingent. 
6.7.6 Attrition Rates 
( .. 
Employee attrition rates, similar to expected life, are a distinctly subjective estimate which IFRS2 
leaves to the company to construct. There Is no mention among any of .the companies of the 
recognition of the inverse correlation which exists between the company share price and employees 
forfei!l"g their stock options. 
6.8 Valuation Verification 
Attempting to re-perform the valuation performed by companies over their share-based Incentive 
schemeS at the end of each reporting period is surprisingly difficult There are sEweral reasons for this: 
• Even with enhanced mandatory disclosure rufes, it is frequently difficultto establish the. exact 
Inputs used in the valuation. Companies often disclose average valuation inputs across a 
multitude oftranches instead of specific inputs for each tranche. For example a weighted 
average strike price (or sometimes even just a range of strike prices). a range of expected (or 
. just contractual) I.ives, a volatility range and an Interest rates range will be stated for all 













• . ~panies often disclose the year during which a tranche of instruments was issued, but not 
the exact ~nt dates. 
• Companies often simply disclose the charge to their income statement resulting from the 
valuation of all scheme tranches in ZAR million; instead of providing detail of the fair value of 
each tranche of ~tions (In ZAR per option). 
• With share settled schemes, given that re-testing Of inputs and fair valuing does not take 
place after grant date, companies simply tend diSClose details only for scheme tranches 
issued over the most recent reporting period. 
In this context, re-performing valuations with a good degree of accuracy in most instances is simply 
not possible. 
For the purposes of this study, the re-performiOQ of the valuation of an appreciation scheme was 
attempted with the aini of gaining more insight Into the way companies estimate model inputs and 
option fair values. The sCheme was that of Massmart Holdings Ltd (JSE share code: MSM). This 
scheme was chosen for the reasonable amount of detail provided In terms of model inputs and fair 
values. The company issued a sizeable tranche of share options in May 2009 and this tranche was 




Strike price setting method: 






Fair value on grant date: 
Quantity issued: 
Total tranche value: 
Volatility used: 
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. Method for volati"tY estimation: historical volatility with' term equivalent to expected life 
Interest rate: 7%* 
Dividend yield: 
* Volatility, int8i'8$t rates and cflVidend yield were only disclosed as ranges by the 'company tor all the tranches 
. ! 
. issued during the year. Th~: numbers indicated abo~ were extrapolated by the author and may be slightly 
different from the exact levels used by the company. 
, 
The Hull-White model was Chosen'for the valuation of the above tranche. The main reason for this is 
,~ , ' 
the fact that it does not require the.estimation of an expected life. It captures the potential for early 
exercise via the exercise multiple. The parameters used are as follOws: 
Strike price: Rn.56 
Spot price on grant date: Rn.01 
Option term: 6 years 
Time to vesting: 3.5 years (the average for the tranche) 
Exercise multiple: 2.8* x strike price 
Volatility: 32.3%** 
Interest rate: 8.5%*** 
Dividend yield: 
Fair value: R25~53 
* This multiple was suggested by Hull and White (20()4) and is related to an average calculated in the US market. 
** The volatility uSed is the. 6 year MSM historical share price voIatitity as of grant date (2i" May 2009). 
- The Interest rate used is the 6 year Inter-bank $W8p rate as of grant date (2i" May 2009). 
- The dividend yield used is the 6 year historical MSM dividend yield ~s of grant date (2i" May 2009). 
Several important points emerge from this exercise, namely: 
1. The company indicates that the method used. to set the strike price is to set it ATM relative to 
the share price on the date before grant date. On the 2ff' May· 2009 the MSM closing share 
price was R 77.80. Taken at face value, this means that the optiOn was struCk at a discount of 
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R77.56 on any of those days. The, only remaining possibility is ~t an intra-dayshare price 
level may have been used to set the strike. 
2. There is a difference in the volatility used by the qompany and the historical volatility, with term 
equivalent to that of the option (34.7% vs. 32.3%). This Is. due to the fact that the company 
uses an expected life for the option· asa method of incorporating the possibility of early 
exercise. The expected life Is shorter .than the contractual life of the option and the volatility 
used by the company is the historical volatility with term equivalent to the expected life. Figure' 
9 below provides the term structure of historical MSM share price volatility as of ztt' May 
2009. 
Figure 9-.MSM Historical volatility 
As can be seen, historical MSM volatility had a downward sloping term structure at that point. 
Based on this, the expected life of the option as estimated by the company was approximately 
3.9 years. This is ~ clear example of how a subjective input such as the expected life of the 
option can cause distortion in other important inputs. In addition, a long term option such as 
an ESO tends to have substantial vega and even small changes in volatility result in 
noticeable change in fair value. 
3. Similarly to volatility, there is a discrepancy in the interest rate used by the company. To some 
extent this is again potentially related to· the shorter. expected life of the option. However, 
interestingly, closer inspection shoWs that·neither swap rates nor zero coupon bond rates with . 
3 to 6 year term were as·low as 7% (as used by the company) as of 2-r.t' May 2009. In this 
context, given the interest rate sensitivity of the option (Rho), the 7% interest further adds to 
discrepancy in value. 
4. The difference in option p~mium of R 2.56 equates to a difference of 10% in relative ter:Jns. It 
also translates to a total,difference .for ,the tranche of R6.96 million. What n8eds'to be 
emphasised here is that: 
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a. Neither model (Binomial with expected tife or HW with an exercise multiple) is entirely 
immune to subjectivity on part of the user. 
b. It is clear that. given the nature and term d shar&based incentive instruments, 
estimating model inputs with a reasonable degree of , accuracy is often difficult. 
c. In this context, from the companys standpoint, it is more important to ensure that the 
model u$8d is broadly appropriate for the task at hand and also that inputs are 
reasonable and tied to reality. . 
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. Share-based Incentive schemes as \an accepted method of aligning shareholder and employee 
incentives have. been around for some. time. ,More recently, market turmOil, accounting scandals 
Increased sharehOlder 8'Miren8sS and· also stronger regulatory scrutiny tlSvesucceeded to ·highllght 
some of inherent deficiencies of the more traditional share-based incentive schemes· such as stOck 
. I 
options. This, together with evolving accounting and tax treatment, has precipitated a shift in share-
based incentive scheme practices (PWC, 2011). 
Globally, several Important developments have emerged over the past several years~ Overall 
issuance of stock options h~s declined. The average size of share-based incentive schemes relative 
to issued share capital has also d~ined. There has been a marked move away from simple stock 
option-type schemes towards less dUutive Sh~re Appreciation Rights and also full quantum share 
schemes. Another important development are performance conditions which have, become 
increasingly prevalent in terms of grant vesting. Shareholders,·regulators and other stakeholders have 
successfully pushed companies to provide greater amounts performance-baSed equity at the expense 
of time-based vesting (PWC, 2011). 
This study was aimed at examining the share-based incentive scheme practices of JSE listed 
companies rn a post IFRS2 and Section 8C environment. The. objectiVe was to determine if South 
African listed companies have similar practices to those observed globally and to attempt to ascertain 
any specific trends. Analysis was based on a sample of 50 large and mid cap companies, with total 
market capitalisation comprising 76%Qf the FTSElJSE All Share Index. A literature review was also 
performed,· encompassing the history and evolution of sha~sed incentives, methods for valuation 
andr~nt developments in their accounting and tax treatment. The areas of focus for the study were 
defined as follows: 
• To examine the accounting and tax treatment of share-based incentives globally and in South 
Africa 
• To examine the current long-term share-based incentive schemes used by JSE .lIsted 
companies 
• To gain an understanding of prevalent scheme types, average scheme size, settlement 
methods, valuation models used, methods for constructing model inputs and the types of 
. performance conditions used 
Based on the data compiied, the following conclUsions were drawn: 
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1. Use of traditional share settled stock options with time-based vesting has declined 
slgnificanUy. Existing ESO's generally, have been' or are In the process of being rePlaced with 
other, more advanced instruments. 
. 2. Share Appreci~on . Rights with cash or net share settlement have gained In popularity as a 
lessdilutive substitute for ESO's. 
3. Full quantum schemes, such as restricted . and performance shares, have seen a fairly 
. dramatic. ascent and are the most popular choice in terms Of offering long-term share-based 
incentives to employees. 
4. Use of performance conditions in relation to the vesting of instruments hasafso increased 
signlficanfly at the expense of simpler time-based' vesting. In this context, total shareholder 
retum (TSR) relative to abasket of peer companies is the most frequenUy used benchmark. 
5. Share settlement is pref8rred choice largely due to the proliferation of full quantum schemes. 
6. The average size of schemes relative to issued share capital is relatively low, indicatinQ that 
companies are cognisant of the dilutive potential of share-based payments. 
7. Black-Schole$, Binomial and Monte Carlo are the most frequenUyused valuation models. The 
Monte Carlo method is used more and more frequently with the increased use of complex 
performance conditions. 
8. In the absence of a liquid ex~nge traded market for options With longer tenor, companies 
almost always resort to using historical volatility asa proxy for future vo/atility. 
I 
,I 
An area which can form the focus of future more in depth research is the valuation of complex share-
based in~ntiveschemes .. For example, the use of market-based performance conditions adds 
another dimension to the valuation process, namely correlation. It would be interesting to ascertain 
how well understood this variable is in terms of constructing the correct valuation models to 
incorporate complexooiperformance-based payoffs. In addition, as things stand currently, most of the 
inputs used even for the valuation Of more mainstream schemes are distincUy subjective and can 
potentially be prone to manipulation. It would be interesting to see if a more detailed analysis of inputs 
and valuation methodology used by companies can reveal any deliberate accounting discrepancies .. 
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(List of companies chosen for the study) 










MPC Mr Price: Group U~ ESO/FuU Quantum 
UIC Ufe HealthcareGtoupHOI$ngsltd SAR/FuU Quantum 
CPt capitecBank HOldinssttd ESO/SAR 
AEG AvengLtd Previously ESO.Has moved to SAR/Full Quantum. 
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